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I. INTRODUCTION
There are few issues in the field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
as pressing and controversial as conflicts of interest and the use of ADR in
criminal cases. These two distinct issues converged in a recent Washington
state court case, State v. Tolias. Tolias raises difficult ethical questions that
must be addressed not only by those in the ADR community, but by the
legal profession more generally, as the formal distinction between
traditional legal practice and quasi-legal alternative dispute resolution
erodes.
II. FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY, AND HOLDINGS
In October 1990, defendant Manuel Tolias and Sylvia Strang moved
into a home located in an agricultural community near Tieton, Washington
in Yakima County. 1 Their neighbors, Ben and Earlene Barnes, asked the
defendant for permission to use an easement over his property so that the
Barneses could load and unload bins during the apple harvest. 2 The
defendant granted the Barneses permission to use the easement.3
In their use of the easement, the Barneses caused damage to defendant's
property. 4 Accordingly, the defendant revoked permission to use the
easement. 5 The relationship between the defendant and his neighbors
steadily deteriorated. In the months that followed defendant's revocation of
the easement, the defendant and the Barneses were involved in numerous
verbal confrontations. 6 The record indicates that most, if not all, of these
confrontations were instigated by the Barneses. 7 The Barneses' acts of
aggression included their continued use of the easement without permission,
vandalization of the defendant's property, and verbal threats directed at the
defendant and Ms. Strang. 8
* 954 P.2d 907 (Wash. 1998).
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In May 1993, the defendant filed a report with the local sheriff and also
made an appointment to speak with Deputy Prosecuting Attorney James
Swanner. 9 Defendant met with Mr. Swanner on June 11, at which time Mr.
Swanner informed the defendant that his case would be difficult to
prosecute but that he would look into the situation and get back to the
defendant.10 A few weeks later, the defendant contacted Mr. Swanner and
learned that Mr. Swanner had spoken with another set of neighbors, the
Ferneliuses, who were also being harassed by the Barneses.11 Mr. Swanner
gave the defendant's name to the Ferneliuses, who later contacted the
defendant and shared their story of harassment with the defendant. 12
On July 26, 1993, while the Barneses were once again crossing the
defendant's property without permission, the defendant assaulted both Mr.
and Mrs. Barnes. 13 Three months before trial, the defendant moved to
recuse the Yakima County Prosecutor's office because Deputy Prosecutor
Swanner was named as a witness. 14 The trial court denied this motion. 15
While the purpose of the motion was to disqualify the Yakima County
Prosecutor's office due to Mr. Swanner's involvement, the motion also
stated in passing that, following the filing of criminal charges and a related
civil action, Jeffrey Sullivan, the elected prosecutor, acted as a
"mediator."'1 6 The defendant stated that several times Mr. Sullivan "met
with all of the parties at their homes ... [to discuss] the case and the wider
dispute.'1 7 At the hearing on the defendant's motion to recuse, there was
no argument as to the nature or propriety of the alleged efforts at
mediation. 18 Indeed, the only mention of Mr. Sullivan's "mediation"
efforts, other than that in defendant's written motion, was a passing













mediation efforts. 19 Mr. Sullivan tried the case against the defendant, who
was found guilty of second degree assault on Mr. Barnes.20
A Washington court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction,
holding that the trial court should have granted defendant's motion to
recuse the Yakima County Prosecutor's office because Mr. Sullivan's
prosecution of the defendant violated the appearance of fairness doctrine. 21
The court of appeals concluded that Mr. Sullivan did in fact act as a
mediator of a neighborhood dispute between the defendant, the Barneses,
and the Ferneliuses. 22
In the court of appeals' view, Mr. Sullivan should have been precluded
from prosecuting the case after attempting to resolve it by mediation.23
Pointing to Washington's Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12(a),24 which
governs the conduct of lawyers who act as mediators, the court of appeals
stressed that the crux of the problem with a lawyer's prior mediation role is
the confidential nature of the mediator's activities. 25
The court of appeals' holding was broad. According to the court,
"[w]hen a prosecuting attorney engages in mediation ... his or her entire
office should be disqualified from participating in subsequent prosecution
unless 'that prosecuting attorney separates himself or herself from all
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id. (citing State v. Tolias, 929 P.2d 1178 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)).
22 See Tolias, 929 P.2d at 1180.
23 See id. at 1181.
24 Rule 1.12(a) provides in pertinent part: "[A] lawyer shall not represent anyone
in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator, mediator or law clerk
to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding consent after disclosure."
WASHnNGTON RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.12(a) (1998).
25 See Tolias, 929 P.2d at 1180 (citing Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F.
Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995)).
The mediator is not merely charged with being impartial, but with receiving and
preserving confidences in much the same manner as the client's attorney. In fact,
the success of mediation depends largely on the willingness of the parties to freely
disclose their intentions, desires, and the strengths and weaknesses of their case;
and upon the ability of the mediator to maintain a neutral position while carefully
preserving the confidences that have been revealed.
Id.
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connection with the case and delegates full authority and control over the
case to a deputy prosecuting attorney.'"26
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the court of appeals
without addressing the merits of the case. There were two related bases for
the supreme court's decision. The first was the fact that, in the supreme
court's view, Mr. Sullivan's alleged mediation efforts, or the appearance of
unfairness created thereby, were not issues raised at trial and accordingly
were not cognizable on appeal.27 The second basis for the supreme court's
reversal was the dearth of substantive information in the record about the
nature or context of Mr. Sullivan's alleged mediation efforts. 28 According
to the supreme court, it was impossible to determine from the record
"whether Mr. Sullivan truly acted as a 'mediator' or was engaging in
discovery or plea negotiations in his capacity as a prosecuting attorney." 29
III. DISCUSSION
The Tolias decisions involve two important ethical issues-conflicts of
interest in ADR and the use of ADR to resolve criminal cases. These issues
are of considerable contemporary relevance. As Robert McKay notes, "the
expanding scope and use of [ADR has made] the standards of ethics
applicable to ADR a matter of ever-growing concern." 30
A. Conflicts of Interest in ADR
The Washington Supreme Court's decision in Tolias said little with
respect to the critical issues presented. The supreme court's reversal of the
26 Tolias, 929 P.2d at 1181-1182 (quoting State v. Stenger, 760 P.2d 357, 360
(Wash. 1988)).
27 See State v. Tolias, 954 P.2d 907, 910 (Wash. 1998).
28 See id. at 910-911. Defense counsel's passing reference to Mr. Sullivan's
mediation efforts, which were made by defense counsel during the pretrial hearing on
defendant's motion to recuse, could not form the basis for upholding the court of
appeals' decision. In its opinion, the supreme court noted that even if this passing
mention of mediation were sufficient to raise the issue at the trial court level, because
the statement nevertheless concerned matters outside the record, it could not be
considered on appeal. See id. at 911. The supreme court stressed that it has to be able
to determine the merits from the record before it. See id.
29 Id. at 911.
30 Robert B. McKay, Ethical Considerations in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
AP,. J., Mar. 1990, at 15, 15.
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court of appeals was based exclusively on procedural grounds. It remains
an open question, then, whether the court of appeals is correct that ethical
considerations preclude a prosecutor who engages in mediation from
subsequently representing the state in a criminal action brought against a
party to that mediation, at least as to matters relating to the subject matter
of the mediation. Attention must therefore be directed at the decision of the
court of appeals.
The court of appeals' decision was grounded in that court's equating the
practice of ADR with legal practice. 31 The court of appeals' decision is one
of several cases in recent years that have applied the legal profession's
conflicts of interest rules to ADR. 32 Applying conflicts rules adapted for
traditional legal practice, the court held that Mr. Sullivan's role as a
mediator created an attorney-client-like relationship between the prosecutor
and the accused. 33 The court of appeals' adoption of the legal profession's
conflicts rules led to that court's application of a kind of firm-taint rule to
the prosecutor's office, disqualifying the entire office in the absence of
adequate conflicts screening. 34
How one defines the roles of participants in ADR will govern the
ethical rules applied to these individuals. 35 If, as the court of appeals in
Tolias believed, the practice of ADR is properly equated with legal
practice, it makes sense to apply, by analogy, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct or Judicial Code of Professional Responsibility.
Some, however, have expressed concern about this simplistic application of
the lawyer's conflicts rules to ADR, disagreeing first and foremost with the
underlying assumption that the practice of ADR constitutes the practice of
31 The court of appeals' equation of ADR with legal practice garners some
scholarly support. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When ADR Is Ancillary to a
Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflicts Issues, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
CosTs LiTIG. 147 (1994).
32 See, e.g., Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah
1995) (holding that an attorney who serves as a mediator cannot subsequently represent
anyone in a "substantially factually related" matter without the consent of the original
parties); Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 863-864 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(disqualifying an entire law firm when a judge, upon retirement, joined the law firm
which represented a party in a matter in which the judge attempted settlement using
mediation-like techniques).
33 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
34 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S.
TEx. L. REv. 407, 421 (1997).
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law. 36 However, as of today, alternatives to the lawyer's rules of
professional responsibility have not been offered and the secondary
literature is largely limited to calls for the development of some code of
ethics drafted exclusively for ADR.
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, for instance, notes that the precise
solution to ethical dilemmas in ADR is not clear. However, she does
suggest that while early cases beginning to deal with conflicts in the
practice of ADR reveal that analogies to the legal profession's rules may
aid decisionmaking, eventually courts will have to grapple with the fact that
the underlying principles of lawyer-representation conflicts rules do not
necessarily match those of third-party neutrals involved in ADR, especially
where, as in Tolias, particular individuals switch roles. 37 Similarly,
Michael Moffitt urges that "[t]he legal profession's standards of conduct,
which are based primarily on an attorney-client relationship in an
adversarial or adjudicative setting, do not specifically address many of the
issues faced by attorney-mediators who do not have 'clients' in the
traditional sense." 38
To some extent, Menkel-Meadow and Moffitt are correct in their
suggestion that courts like Tolias are remiss in applying the legal
profession's conflicts rules to ADR. There are fundamental differences
between legal practice and ADR that cannot be ignored. The lawyer-
representation conflicts rules are grounded in certain values, namely, client
loyalty and confidentiality. As Menkel-Meadow suggests, these values may
have little place in ADR. There is a fundamental difference in the roles
played by neutrals and lawyer-advocates that courts are remiss in ignoring.
A lawyer is an advocate who must zealously advance his client's interests
within the bounds of the law. A neutral, on the other hand, is just that; he
is, by definition, "untainted by interest or bias in behalf of or against any
party. ,,39
Given the very different roles performed by neutrals and lawyers, it is
perhaps unreasonable to impose upon neutrals the ethical rules of the legal
profession and to attribute to parties involved in ADR the same
36 See, e.g., id.
37 See id. at 339-340.
38 Michael Moffitt, Loyalty, Confidentiality and Attorney-Mediators: Professional
Responsibility in Cross-Profession Practice, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATON L. REv. 203, 204
(1996); see also Alison Smiley, Professional Codes and Neutral Lawyering: An
Emerging Standard Governing Nonrepresentational Attorney Mediation, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICs 213, 217-222 (1993).
39 McKay, supra note 30, at 23.
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expectations held by lawyers' clients. Do participants in ADR, for
example, really expect their neutrals to exhibit to them the same kind of
loyalty that characterizes the attorney-client relationship when the neutral-
participant relationship exhibits few of the trappings of an attorney-client
relationship?
Therefore, on one level it is certainly true that the analogy between the
conflicts problems arising in ADR and those arising in legal practice is
anything but perfect. Nevertheless, there is a good reason why courts like
Tolias are so attracted to the lawyer conflicts rules; it has to do with the
issue of confidentiality. Confidentiality is an important, indeed critical,
ingredient of ADR, especially mediation. 4° Although the lawyer and the
mediator have distinct roles, neither can effectively perform their respective
roles without guaranteeing that what is said in their presence will remain
confidential. That confidentiality is, of course, destroyed, or at least put at
risk, when the mediator or lawyer proceeds to represent interests adverse to
the client or ADR participant. In the context of confidentiality, the analogy
between the lawyer and neutral is nearly perfect and it becomes clear why
courts like Tolias are so attracted to the legal profession's conflicts rules.
If, at some point, ethical rules are crafted exclusively for attorney-
neutrals, these rules will have to address the issue of confidentiality. Unless
the importance of confidentiality is to be discounted in the context of ADR,
reliance on the legal profession's strict disqualification rules may well be
unavoidable.
At first blush, the solution to fact patterns like that arising in Tolias is
simple: to prohibit prosecutors from engaging in mediation or,
alternatively, to institute the complicated and potentially disruptive
screening mechanisms suggested by the court of appeals. The latter solution
is fairly straight-forward and many law firms in the private sector have
successfully instituted screening mechanisms to avoid conflicts problems.
The obvious drawback with such an approach is that the prosecutor most
familiar with the case is prohibited from prosecuting it. In the criminal law
context, this may be particularly undesirable as the implications for the
general public of an unsuccessful criminal prosecution are always higher
than when private litigation is involved. The stakes, however, can be kept
40 The importance of confidentiality to the success of ADR is widely accepted. See
2 EDWARD A. DAUER, MANUAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 22.01 (1994) (noting that confidentiality is both an advantage and a requisite of the
use of ADR); JOHN H. WILKINSON ET AL., DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVIN ADR
PRACTICE BOOK § 26A.2, at 304 (Supp. 1999) (noting that "[c]onfidentiality is one of
the most attractive qualities of ADR"); McKay, supra note 30, at 23.
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at a reasonable level by keeping the most egregious criminal offenders out
of ADR.
As for simply barring prosecutors from engaging in ADR, this solution
may be easier said than done. "Defining what processes constitute ADR has
always been difficult." 41 There is, therefore, a potential slippery slope.
Although the precise nature of Mr. Sullivan's "mediation efforts" in Tolias
was unclear, it appeared to involve some attempt at facilitating an
understanding between the defendant, the Barneses, and other neighbors. 42
This probably comes close to mediation in its purest sense. But ADR, of
which mediation is a form, is a fluid concept, and who is to say that, with
the assistance of clever defense attorneys, ADR could not come to
embrace, for example, plea bargains with nontraditional sanctions like
restitution?
While it may not be likely that cases like Tolias foreshadow a trip down
a slippery slope of prosecutorial disqualification, it is at least a possibility.
Where, as here, the consequences are so grave-disqualification of an
entire prosecutor's office-a little hypersensitivity is a good thing. What is
needed most is not independent conflicts rules for ADR, although these
would be helpful, but rather a clear definition of what is and what is not
mediation, and this definition must be clear to everyone involved in the
legal process-prosecutors, courts, defendants, and defense counsel. Each
must be on the same page so to speak. Once this definition is in place, we
can at least learn to live with and control, through screening devices or
otherwise, the consequences of employing ADR in the criminal justice
process.
B. The Use of ADR in Criminal Cases
The Tolias decisions give tacit approval to the use of mediation in
criminal cases. The use of ADR in the criminal law context is among the
most controversial uses of ADR. Although the use of ADR within the
criminal justice system has received little attention, its use is widespread. 43
41 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Resolution Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1871, 1885
(1997).
42 See State v. Tolias, 954 P.2d 907, 907-908 (Wash. 1998).
43 See Terenia Urban Guill, A Framework for Understanding and Using ADR, 71
TUL. L. REV. 1313, 1327 (1997). In 1993 alone, victim-offender mediation programs
dealt with 16,500 criminal cases. See PACT INST. OF JUSTICE, VICTIM-OFFENDER
RECONCILIATION PROGRAM DIRECTORY 1 (Harriet Fagan & John Gehm eds., 1993). In
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Criminal law has attempted to use mediation in two ways. 44 First, victim-
offender mediation (VOM) programs attempt to bring the parties most
directly affected by a crime together in order to provide each party with a
perspective of the criminal act they would not otherwise have.45 Some
suggest that VOM offers the possibility of more flexible and adaptive
punishments through, for example, restitutionary and compensatory
schemes. 46  VOM is also promoted as a channel for remorse,
acknowledgment, and reconciliation. 47
The second way in which ADR has been used in criminal law is in
community dispute resolution programs.48 These programs attempt to
remove minor disputes from the court system. 49 Typically, crimes such as
simple assault, misdemeanor larceny, and criminal trespass are channeled
into community mediation programs where, in lieu of formal prosecution,
they are mediated.50
Although the use of ADR in criminal cases can potentially alleviate
crowded criminal dockets and can have a therapeutic effect upon both
victims and offenders, the use of ADR in these cases may be quite
problematic. 51 Criminal law ADR, especially VOM, has garnered much
criticism. Much of this criticism is grounded in concerns about power
1994, there were approximately 125 such programs in the United States and Canada
combined. See Sheila D. Porter & David B. Ells, Mediation Meets the Criminal Justice
System, 23 CoLo. LAW. 2521, 2521 (1994).
44 See Stephen S. Cook, Mediation as an Alternative to Probation Revocation
Proceedings, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1995, at 48, 48.
45 See id. Because the record in the Tolias case contained few details about Mr.
Sullivan's attempted "mediation," it is difficult to identify the type of criminal law
mediation taking place. However, the few details contained in the factual record suggest
that some form of VOM had taken place.
46 See generally MARK S. UMmBRrr FT AL., VICIM MEETS OFFENDER: TiE
IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994).
47 See id. at 5.
48 See Cook, supra note 44, at 48.
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve
Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994) (arguing that
VOM disserves the interests of victims, offenders, and the state and urging the
decoupling of mediation from the criminal justice system).
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imbalances between victims and offenders, 52 potential constitutional rights
violations, 53 and the state's privatization of public justice through ADR. 54
Some argue that in criminal mediation, the balance of power may be
tipped against either party for different reasons. 55 "On the one hand, a
prisoner may be coerced into participation through the specter of doing
poorly in a jury trial. On the other hand, the victim also may feel coerced
into participating in mediation by the uncertainty of a jury trial or pressure
from a state official." 56
In addition to power issues, VOM raises questions regarding
constitutional rights. There is the potential that defendant rights, which are
scrupulously protected in criminal trials, will be sidestepped in VOM. 57
These rights might include the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 58 VOM also raises
the additional constitutional question of whether VOM programs, run by
prosecutors' offices, can potentially eliminate the judicial branch from the
determination of guilt, which, of course, raises separation of powers
concerns.
59
Finally, the use of ADR in criminal cases implicates an important
concern that also arises outside of the criminal law context-whether
private justice should be permitted in situations implicating the public
interest. Jennifer Gerarda Brown argues that certain truisms about the
criminal law-namely that criminal actions belong to the state, not the
victim-lead inexorably to the conclusion that the criminal law should be
enforced publicly rather than through private dispute resolution
mechanisms. 60 The major concern expressed with respect to the
privatization of criminal law is that resolving criminal cases privately
cannot satisfy the public's need for oversight and input.61
52 See id. at 1271-1272.
53 See id. at 1287-1291.
54 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
1935, 1968 (1993).
55 See Brown, supra note 51, at 1271-1272; Guill, supra note 43, at 1329.
56 Guill, supra note 43, at 1329.
57 See Brown, supra note 51, at 1287-1291.
58 See id.
59 See Guill, supra note 43, at 1330.
60 See Brown, supra note 54, at 1968.
61 See id. at 1969.
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For some, "justice" is essentially and necessarily public. The
quintessential statement of this view was put forth by Owen Fiss in his
seminal article, Against Settlement.62 Fiss expressed the role of adjudication
in the distribution of justice as follows:
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers chosen by
the parties but public officials chosen by a process in which the public
participates. These officials... possess a power that has been defined and
conferred by public law, not by private agreement. .. to explicate and
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into
accord with them.63
For those like Fiss who revere the authoritative declaration of public
values by public officials, decisions like Tolias, which give tacit approval to
criminal law mediation, must be particularly distressing. For these
individuals, debate about the ethical rules governing ADR simply misses
the point, at least when the public interest is involved. In their view, the
key question is whether ADR can properly be employed at all. If Tolias and
the increasing use of ADR in criminal cases is any indication, those
opposed to the use of ADR to resolve these cases may be bucking a strong
trend in the opposite direction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tolias case is reflective of several trends in ADR. The first is the
tendency among courts to equate legal practice with the practice of ADR
and to apply the conflicts of interest rules of the former to the latter. The
second trend reflected by Tolias is the increasing use of ADR in criminal
cases. These are complex and controversial issues with which the legal and
ADR communities are only beginning to grapple.
Andre R. Imbrogno
62 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
63 Id. at 1085.

